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[–] Abstract and Keywords

This chapter is intended to outline the main postmodern theoretical influences in archaeology. Although it may be difficult to identify a distinct postmodern strand of archaeology, it is apparent that there are trends and issues within archaeological theory that are clearly influenced by postmodern lines of thought. One example is the issue of relativity of 'facts' and historicity of interpretations stressed by many post-processual archaeologists. This ambivalence regarding archaeological data has for some led to a loss of faith in archaeology's abilities to say something definitive about the past. For others, it has initiated critical discussions of how, and under what conditions, narratives of the past are produced. For instance, there has been an increasing concern with ethical issues and the political use of archaeology (e.g. heritage management, local and indigenous archaeologies, the repatriation of objects and human remains). Archaeology in the postmodern condition is thus principally characterized by increasing diversity in subject areas and theory, but also by a broader definition of the discipline and its roles in contemporary society.

Keywords: postmodernism, post-structuralism, grand narratives, multivocality, heterogeneity, relativism

Introduction

The last decades of the 20th century witnessed a great turmoil in the Humanities and the social sciences that generally is referred to as the 'postmodern turn'. Whether postmodernism constitutes an epistemic shift (postmodernity) from modernism is up for debate, but most view it as a continuity, possibly a late stage, of the modernist project rather than the emergence of a new era (Lyotard 1991: 34; Brown 1994: 13). The term 'postmodernity' is hence often avoided in favour of more descriptive terms such as 'high modernity', 'late modernity', 'hypermodernity', 'supermodernity', 'late capitalism', 'hypercapitalism', 'post-industrialism', 'Information-Age'. The abundance of terms indicate a general uncertainty about what constitutes the present condition, but it is also obvious that a majority of scholars recognize that something has happened, although they are unsure what it actually is and where it will lead us. Notwithstanding the question whether or not we have entered a new era, we may still refer to postmodernism as a certain kind of reasoning about the world in which truth no longer can be verified. Postmodernism is not a coherent, elaborated system of thought that can easily be defined, but is rather a related set of concepts that take different shapes in different subject areas.

The origin of the particularly social branch of postmodernism is found in the so-called post-structural movement of the 1960s in France, in which scholars such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Roland Barthes began to question the validity of positivist science. Their writings comprise a varied mix of important critique, theoretical and methodical development, but also playful provocative rhetoric and a sometimes very multifaceted style of writing. There is a complex relation between what has been categorized as post-structural theory and what may pass as postmodernism; the two are not the same, but share many similar traits (see Toth 2010: 37–45; Huyssen 1987: 205–16; Olsen 2010: 40). In short, however, postmodernism can be characterized as an antithesis of the modern. Instead of seeking order, coherence, regularity, and general laws, postmodernism celebrates diversity and plurality, fragmentation, and indeterminacy (Harvey 1989: 9; Hassan 1995: 131f.; Eagleton 2003: 13).

The postmodern turn took a few unexpected detours when it first appeared in archaeology during the early 1980s. The Cambridge school of contextual archaeology, later to be known as 'post-processual' or 'interpretative' archaeology, was quick to embrace the new radical discussion within the humanities and the social sciences. Many have pointed out the postmodern influences in post-processual archaeologies (e.g. Hodder 1990; Bintliff 1991; Shanks and Tilley 1992: xx; Thomas 1995: 343, 351; Flannery 2006: 9). There are obvious similarities in manner of critique and choice of issues, but it would nevertheless be an oversimplification to equate post-processual archaeology with postmodern archaeology. For instance, early post-processual archaeology found much inspiration from the critical theory of the Frankfurt school, whose critique of positivism and foundationalism represents an antimodernist rather than a postmodern stance (cf. Held 1980). This is also the case for the introduction of, for example, existentialism and phenomenology during the 1990s. Another difference is that post-processual archaeology was intentionally developed as a programme, and is therefore more cohesive than the variety of different meanings attached to postmodernism (Walsh 1992: 53; Thomas 2001: 14).

The question is further complicated because both the proponents and critics of the postmodern tend to simplify the discussion by resorting to stereotyped 'straw men', such as the stiff and conservative traditionalist scholar on the one hand and the shallow hyperrelativist on the other. In reality, modernist and postmodernist thought are seldom so closely juxtaposed, but seem to exist parallel to each other in various amplitudes in different social and cultural layers. Instead of trying to pin-point certain possible examples of postmodern archaeologies, it is thus more fruitful to examine a few central themes that are generally associated with postmodern reasoning and discuss how they have been received and incorporated in archaeological theory. In the following text I have focused on (a) the relativization of knowledge and meaning, (b) the form in which science and arguments are presented, and (c) the shift from the general and homogeneous to diversity and heterogeneity.

The Relativization of Truth and Knowledge

How to define truth and examine its subjective, relative, objective, or absolute aspects is a fundamentally philosophical question which lies outside the remit of the archaeological discipline. Nonetheless, a central theme in the postmodern critique is the questioning of absolute truths, universal laws, and the validity of scientific objectivity. The main point is not to refute truth altogether, but to point out that there are no viable means by which we can specify such absolute principles (Eagleton 2003: 103). In postmodern epistemology, truth and knowledge is generally understood as something that is *produced* within a dominant discourse. A general argument by post-structuralists and critical theorists is that knowledge is historically situated and tends to follow the logics of a particular 'régime of truth' (Foucault 1980: 133). For example, that the earth only was 6,000 years old was a fact for many educated individuals as late as the 19th century. It was not simply a matter of belief in the supreme authority of the Bible; the young age of the earth was actually 'verified' by geology and palaeontology (Cutler 2003; Thomas 2004: 44f.). Hence, if different periods in history have regarded their truths as solid and empirically based, why should it be any different today?

In modernist scientific archaeology, a main objective was to gain more adequate knowledge of the past based on logical reasoning and empirical data in opposition to myth, folklore, and antiquarianism (Hodder 1999: 1). Different interpretations were certainly discussed and disputed, but many scholars still subscribed to the idea that it was possible to establish 'how it once was' by scientific means. The once-obvious sharp distinction between science and non-science is dissolved by the postmodernist argument that we all are locked in our presents, and that our interpretations of the past are inevitably tied to contemporary conditions. Indeed, objects and monuments have been interpreted differently in different times. Megaliths have been seen as dwellings of giants, Stone Age axes were considered to be 'faeries' weapons' or 'thunder-stones' caused by lightning, etc. (Trigger 1989a). That interpretations tend to vary over time was long ago recognized by social scientists and historians (e.g. Collingwood 1946). In post-processual archaeology, this relativist argument was reinforced by (post-)structural linguistics that argued that a text never has a fixed content or straightforward meaning (Hodder 1987). The meaning of a text is claimed to lie in its appropriation, which implies that there can be no 'true' or definite reading of a text and that any original meaning is out of reach (Barthes 1977). When applied to archaeology, it suggests not only that interpretations of the past are context-dependent and historically situated but also that there are no means to ever find out 'how it really was'.

The notion that our interpretations are historically situated was a cornerstone in the post-processual critique of the

processual confidence in positivist science (Hodder 1987: 106, 152; Shanks and Tilley 1987: 25). However, there is of course a great difference between recognizing that there may be alternate readings of the past and subscribing to a hyperrelativist view of an infinite number of equally valid interpretations (cf. Knapp 1996). Roy Bhaskar (1979) has formulated the problem as a duality of *epistemological relativism*, which recognizes that knowledge is situated in a particular time and culture, and *judgemental relativism*, which additionally claims that each form of knowledge is equally valid (cf. Brown 1994: 27f.). Within contemporary archaeology many are content to acknowledge that our interpretation of the past is affected by the present but not necessarily determined by it (e.g., Hodder 1991: 30).

The crucial question is to what extent the past is the present and to what degree we can confidently speak about the past. Michael Shanks seems to subscribe to an epistemological relativism when he writes: 'History is constantly rewritten as the present changes' and: 'We cannot transcend the located nature of historical understanding' (1992: 28, 45; but see 1998: 21ff.). This is a position that he seems to share with many other leading post-processual archaeologists (e.g. Hodder 1987: 152f.; Thomas 2001: 10). It is more difficult to find proponents of judgmental relativism in archaeology. There are such tendencies within some strands of 'contemporary archaeologies', where the main significance of archaeological practice no is longer necessarily about interpreting the past but 'in the very process of engaging with the material remains of the past in the present' (Holtorf 2005: 544). Such a position of agnosticism toward the past does not, however, necessarily imply a hyperrelativist standpoint, but instead a clever way of avoiding the problem by focusing on archaeology as a contemporary practice.

In mainstream archaeology, however, the fluidity of meaning and the lack of objective knowledge do not seem to be a major issue; it is rare to find anyone proposing that all accounts of the past are equally valid or legitimate. On the contrary, at least the leading post-processual archaeologists argue that, although our interpretations of the past are to a certain extent influenced by our social contexts, the number of possible readings of the past are nonetheless restricted by the archaeological record (e.g. Tilley 1990: 136; Hodder 1992: 167; Thomas 2001: 4; Rowlands 2007: 69). Indeed, archaeology is in a sense less liable to judgemental relativism than many other humanist disciplines because it primarily deals with material data. Material traces of the past are seldom randomly distributed, but deposited in more or less closed contexts and layers. They are thus locked in time and space relative to other objects, which restricts the numbers of reasonable interpretations. There are also means of strengthening or refuting an interpretation by appealing to independent analyses such as microscopic traces of use-wear, or analysing biological remains in terms of their isotopic or genetic composition. It thus seems that for most archaeologists the idea of archaeological 'facts' being historically situated is more about being self-aware and reflexive when interpreting the past rather than an argument that 'anything goes'.

Deconstructing Grand Narratives

The postmodern perspective on knowledge as relative has also had implications for the way science is presented. For the literary theorist Jean-François Lyotard, the principal aspect defining the postmodern condition is the collapse of faith in totalizing and synthesizing texts, the so called 'grand narratives' or 'meta-narratives' (1984). The traditional synthesizing form of the modernist treatise is an explicit result of the positive perspective on knowledge as accumulative and continuously progressing towards more precise and accurate accounts. The idea that the past can be understood on the basis of one basic principle (e.g. evolution or diffusion) is, of course, too simplistic. The obvious problem with such a grand perspective is that it tends to be reductionist by primarily focusing on large-scale similarities while neglecting normal variability. Data thus suffer the risk of either being dismissed or forced to fit the logical structure of the narrative (cf. Tilley 1990: 143f). Further objections concern the linear structure of the narrative, which also tends to be teleological because the narrative form normally follows a certain linear structure from beginning to end. For example, within a grand narrative of social evolution, history inevitably 'needs' to move from clan- to class-based systems (Gosden 1999: 471)

The postmodern alternative to totalizing historical narratives is to emphasize plurality and multiplicity in the production of knowledge. The grand narratives need to be *deconstructed*, that is, broken down into their core elements, each of which needs to be scrutinized and evaluated (Nicholson and Seidman 1996: 9f.). Then, instead of building new metanarratives, history can be presented as open-ended montage or simply as a multitude of micronarratives that do not need to fit with each other. The postmodern incredulity vis-à-vis grand narratives thus

conveys an implicit shift from a general perspective to the particular and the marginal.

In archaeology, Thomsen's three-period system and the ambition of museum curators to present complete and coherent collections are both typical expressions of the modernist ideal (Walsh 1992). The grand scope is a trait running through most of the history of the discipline. In processual archaeology, for instance, it has been argued that the long temporal scale of archaeology, and the accumulated nature of the archaeological record, suggest that it is primarily general cultural adaptations that can be reached with some degree of scientific confidence (Binford 1983; Sherratt 1995). Post-processual archaeology is typically more ambivalent towards the question of scale. In accordance with typical postmodernist arguments, Hodder suggests that archaeology should indeed focus on diversity rather than on general history. Particular events, he stresses, can constitute 'narrative windows' that will function as keys to understanding the 'larger flows'. Such small-scale histories may not always be commensurable, but this is considered a price worth paying in order to avoid generalized grand narratives (Hodder 1999: 137, 147, 176; but see also Hodder 2003: 88, 91). Others have elaborated this way of presenting the past in the form of 'singularized histories', in which each locale and chain of events is interpreted as individual fragments instead of as parts of a general narrative (e.g. Magnússon 2003). There are also those who attempt to evade the linearity and teleological aspects of the written text by using electronic media. One example is Cornelius Holtorf's doctoral thesis (2000–08), which employed hypertext links between images and paragraphs, thus making each new reading potentially different from the previous.

There can be little doubt that the postmodern objection to totalizing narratives, and its emphasis on diversity and the particular, has had some impact on contemporary theoretical archaeology. It seems, however, that the post-processual stress on the local and the particular has had only a minor effect on the way the past is presented. Despite widespread advocacy of a shift in focus, and the few attempts to break with the teleology and totalizing nature of the modernist narrative, the scope of most archaeological texts still encompasses the general structures and patterns of a certain time period or a culture (Thomas 2004: 53; Johnson 2006: 123). It seems that the particular and individual are mainly incorporated as vignettes intended to provide our narratives of the past with a sense of intimacy and detail (cf. Hodder 2003: 91).

Pluralism, Heterogeneity, and Multivocality

A consequence of the postmodern incredulity concerning grand narratives and the large scale is the heterogeneous perspective on societies as constituted by a multitude of individual voices (Harvey 1989: 9; Eagleton 1996: 103). This emphasis on plurality and diversity may seem to contradict the typical post-structural emphasis on discourse and structure: it is difficult to argue for the importance of structures and discourse on the one hand while simultaneously emphasizing heterogeneity and polymorphous relations. The postmodern emphasis on the particular and specific are, however, not simply about taking an opposite stance towards the modernist totalizing perspective. Foucault, for instance, is very clear about not privileging any specific level between the event and the structure, instead emphasizing that 'there are actually a whole order of levels of different types of events differing in amplitude, chronological breadth, and capacity to produce effects' (1980: 114). In his own particular 'archaeology', Foucault investigates how 'régimes of truth' are articulated in the discourse on interstitial and transgressing categories such as the mad or criminals. The focus is generally on the small scale, on particular events and individual statements, but from a point of view in which the agents seldom fully recognize the structural background of their actions. The individual ways of *experiencing* the world may thus be heterogeneous and multivocal, but taken together the multitude is nonetheless largely confined within the logic of a particular discourse (1980: 133). There is hence a great difference between arguing for social heterogeneity and subscribing to the modern bourgeois idea of the individual as an autonomous agent. In some postmodernist (and indeed archaeological) thought, these two perspectives are nonetheless sometimes confused (cf. Eagleton 1996: 88f.; Brown 2005: 88f.; Hodder 1987: 79f.; 2003: 84; Thomas 2004: 121ff.).

There is little doubt that modernist archaeology did recognize some level of social heterogeneity, but it was seldom concerned with individual perspectives—apart from a few especially prominent historical figures. In processual archaeology the individual is also downplayed in favour of environmental adaptation and a structure-functionalist perspective of societies as closed entities. In this case, post-processual archaeology is indifferent. On the one hand, the notion on heterogeneity is incorporated and emphasized, but on the other there is less stress on the importance of discourse. Perhaps the post-structural displacement of individual agency and experience was too

close to the processual perspective to which they were opposed? Instead, Hodder and most post-processual archaeologists advocate a mixture of Collingwood's hermeneutics and the 'softer' post-structuralism of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, who each in different ways advocate a middle way between structural constraint and individual agency (Fahlander 2003: 18f.). On this issue, many strands of post-processual archaeology betray a certain inconsistency when they argue for social heterogeneity and multivocality (individual experiences) at the same time as they advocate hermeneutics as a means to understand social collectives (cultures) as wholes. This ambivalence concerning the individual experience as against the generalizing scope of the narrative has always characterized the post-processual movement.

In later post-processual texts of the 1990s, the focus shifts from the polyphony of past social diversity (cultural relativism) towards present-day interpretative pluralism. In contemporary archaeology, the concept of *multivocality* generally refers to the divergent meanings held by different groups of people of today and the question of who 'owns' the past (Habu, Farcetti, and Matsunaga 2008). Many archaeologists argue that we have a responsibility to engage a variety of academic and non-academic views, and to accept that there are both complementary and contradictory interpretations which we cannot just dismiss as 'unscientific'. This ethical dimension of multivocality is typically inspired by the post-structural notions of the relation between power and knowledge, and the historicity of knowledge.

The difficulties which indigenous groups face in making their interpretations or experiences of the past heard and recognized are well known and debated in archaeology (Trigger 1989b). Traditionally, the validity of a statement depends on who utters it; a professor is generally regarded as a more reliable source than your layman neighbour. Some archaeologists, however, question this 'authoritarian attitude' of traditional academia and argue instead for a pluralist and 'democratic' exploration of the past as fragmented, provisional and negotiated (Shanks and Tilley 1992: 261). The main idea seems to be to decentre scientific authority in favour of pluralism. To promote equal and plural discussion about the past is, however, a slippery slope to walk; on the one hand it may be seen as both fair and righteous to embrace a wider variety of voices, especially when dealing with the past of former colonies, but on the other hand it is problematic to promote, for example, revisionist interpretations of Auschwitz and the Holocaust (cf. Harvey 1989: 357). Moreover, there are fundamental problems with a dominant party encouraging 'the other' to respond and express their perspective, since this can never be an equal relationship. The professional Western archaeologist can hardly ignore years of training in argumentation and reasoning, any more than s/he can disregard his/her social and cultural capital in terms of confidence and self-esteem. Yannis Hamilakis stresses that we need to be aware that 'a multivocality that fails to address the structures of power and authority is at the very least a chimera, and at worst an appeasement of the manufacturing of consent' (1999: 75). The post-colonial theorist Gayatri Spivak (1988) expressed this problem in terms of the question: 'Can the subaltern speak?' The point here is not whether the subordinate classes can voice an opinion, but whether their voices are recognized as they intended within the dominant discourse. Spivak despairs as to whether such communication is ever possible, but many archaeologists seem more optimistic (e.g. Shanks and Tilley 1992: 60; Hodder 2003, 28).

Despite the efforts of many concerned archaeologists, the multitude of different voices nonetheless seem rather limited in diversity. We simply do not find the variability in opinions that have been assumed, neither among academics nor non-academicss (cf. Tilley 1990; Burström 1998, 32). There are of course controversies concerning the interpretation of certain objects or monuments, but on the whole, the public's views of the past often congregate around a limited number of typical themes. On reflection, this may not be unexpected: as social beings, living in institutionalized societies in a globalized world, it is perhaps no surprise that our personal perspectives tend to coincide and fall into a limited number of categories. Under these circumstances, is the idea of infinite heterogeneity and multivocality perhaps more a matter of ethical and political concern than a social reality? The idea of putting ethics before epistemology may indeed be considered a typical postmodern trait, but again, in the broad spectrum of contemporary archaeological theory the commitment to multivocality is as yet limited to a relatively small group of archaeologists within the field of heritage management or Western archaeologists working in former colonies.

Have We Always Been Postmodern?

The debate about whether archaeology was about to take a postmodern turn reached its zenith during the late 1980s and early 1990s. At that point, postmodern relativism was considered a severe threat, which led some to

paint the future of archaeology in dark colours. For instance, Yoffee and Sherratt (1993: 7) warned that archaeology was about to be hijacked by certain factions who would abuse it for their various political aims. There were also concerns whether postmodernist issues of diversity, pluralism, and heterogeneity simply follow the logic of a globalized capitalist economy to which we all are subjugated (Lyotard 1984: 38; Eagleton 1996: 133; Harvey 2006; but see also Jameson 2005: 165). For instance, postmodern identity politics that encourages multiculturalism and heterogeneity over traditional nation states certainly benefits globalized free-market capitalism. Such politics can also be viewed as a strategy of the dominant discourse (Western capitalism) to maintain power by encouraging fragmentation and heterogeneity among its rivals. The dissolution of ethnic identity makes it more difficult for marginalized groups to voice their claims of being recognized as an oppressed collective (cf. Wylie 2007: 103; Spivak 1988). For example, if women of different social classes, or from different parts of the world, do not have enough in common to represent a social category, it is difficult to point out any structural inequalities between the sexes (Young 1994: 713f.). This political perspective on postmodernist epistemology does not necessarily suggest a global capitalist conspiracy, but it may perhaps serve as an example of how scientific discourse is generally intertwined with politics and economics.

But does the suggested relation between ideology and research interests imply that postmodern epistemology is a recent invention with little or no relevance to premodern societies? Are archaeologies that embrace plurality, heterogeneity, and multivocality simply a reflection of capitalist economy and neoliberal ideology? If that indeed is the case, it can be argued that those concepts may not be relevant for archaeological interpretation of the past. It is, however, important to note that many of the themes associated with postmodernism were in various respects addressed long before the birth of post-structuralism. After all, the modern era is not entirely as homogeneous as it is often characterized. For instance, a similar historical relativism to that of Collingwood is found already in Rankean historicism of the 19th century (Berding 2005). Moreover, matters of social heterogeneity and hybridity in small-scale societies were discussed by several anthropologists writing in the first half of the 20th century; anthropologists such as Robert Lowie, Ralph Linton, Georges Balandier, Marcel Mauss, and later Edmund Leach, developed an understanding of the changing lifecycle of the individual, intracultural social heterogeneity, as well as awareness that most societies are in a continuous process of change (Mercier 1966: 155–74). These observations and insights are the result of empirical observations made by anthropologists long before such issues came to be associated with postmodernism (cf. Thomas 2004: 42). In fact some archaeologists have actually suggested that it is the pluralist view of the social that is the norm of the past, and that the modernist homogenizing perspective represents an anomaly (Fletcher 2004: 309). The image of small-scale societies as inert, traditional, and 'cold' may simply have been a product of colonialism and the homogenizing ideals of the global modern project. For instance, the sociologist Lamo de Espinosa (2002) points out that, of 160 states throughout the world during the 19th century, only 28 were homogeneous (in the sense that 90 per cent or more of the population within the national borders shared an ethnic identity). European nation-states, however, differ radically from nations of other continents in that they include only 4.6 languages per state, in contrast to the worldwide average number of 30. It is thus not surprising that western European discourse has viewed homogeneity, rather than heterogeneity and diversity, as the general norm.

Summary

It is safe to say that the modernist–postmodernist debate has revealed major contradictions, which challenge the very essence of archaeology. Wherever one may stand in that particular debate, it is difficult either to neglect the postmodern critique or to remain untroubled in maintaining the modernist ideals of an objective science. It is evident that different strands of interpretative archaeologies are affected by typical postmodern themes, but that does not imply that empirical and essentialist ideals are issues of the past. There are still many prominent archaeologists who elaborate more positivist-inspired approaches that aspire to study the past 'in as scientific and objective a manner as possible' (Renfrew 1999: 2; cf. O'Brien and Lyman 2000; Shennan 2004). In comparison to the early debate, however, the contemporary scene seems less polarized: there has been a certain amount of convergence between opposing scientific perspectives. A survey of the leading journals with a focus on theory and method indicates that archaeological theory at the beginning of the 21st century generally consists of a mix of traditional elements and themes associated with postmodernism as discussed here. It is also important to note that many of the recent theoretical influences in contemporary archaeology—such as existentialism and phenomenology—are of a non-essentialist and 'anti-modern' character rather than being part of the postmodern

dogma (Collins 2000: 753ff.). The postmodern influence in archaeology is thus probably best discussed in terms of Wittgensteinian 'family resemblances', in which various postmodern elements are present in a higher or lower degree combined with other strands of thought (Fahlander 2003: 43ff.).

Instead of trying to pinpoint a typical postmodern archaeology, it is thus probably more relevant to discuss the postmodern impact in terms of consequences. The postmodern turmoil may indeed cause a few to lose faith in archaeology as a science concerned with the past. But instead of resorting to pointless judgemental relativism, some have sidestepped the epistemological problems by changing the focus to the discipline itself and elaborating on e.g. purely theoretical matters—the history of archaeological thought, heritage management, museum pedagogy—or by focusing on archaeology as a contemporary practice. Others have sought refuge in ethical issues, choosing to explore the implications of multivocality, the handling of human remains in museum exhibitions, and questions of repatriation (cf. Shanks and Tilley 1992: xviii; Cranstone 2005: 86; Scarre and Scarre 2006). Contemporary archaeological theory seems thus to be characterized above all by increased diversity in the ways we 'do archaeology'. In a somewhat unexpected way, the introduction of postmodern epistemology in archaeology has thus expanded the scope of the discipline and its roles in society (cf. Thomas 1995: 338; 2004). Whether this state of affairs is 'good' or 'bad' for archaeology is up to debate. Diversity is a double-edged sword; on the one hand it may seem constructive and liberating, but on the other, it may lead to fragmentation and lack of disciplinary coherence.

Suggested reading

Terry Eagleton's *The Illusions of Postmodernism* (1996) contains a critical discussion of postmodernism with references to many central texts. For an archaeological perspective, see Bernard Knapp's 'Archaeology without gravity? Postmodernism and the past', published in *Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory* 3: 127–58 (1996). An overview of post-structural thought in archaeology is found in *Archaeology After Structuralism: Poststructuralism and the Practice of Archaeology*, edited by Ian Bapty and Tim Yates (1990). A good collection of texts discussing multivocality is *Evaluating Multiple Narratives: Beyond Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist archaeologies*, edited by Junko Habu, Clare Fawcett, and John M. Matsunaga (2008). A recent discussion on ethics in archaeology is found in Chris and Geoffrey Scarre's edited volume *The Ethics of Archaeology: Philosophical Perspectives on Archaeological Practice* (2006).

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