Operational Ethnicity.
Serial practice and materiality

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> The same day I experienced among them that I was caught by the same shyness, the same itching clumsiness that I felt back home, as if something was not in order within me, as if I did not correspond to the right ideal, shortly said: as if I was not a Jew, and that was a bit strange among Jews, in a concentration camp, I think.
> (Imre Kertész 2002 [1975]: 95, my translation).

This article is firstly concerned with Siân Jones's use of *ethnicity*. Secondly, an interpretative strategy is outlined which to a greater extent defines Jones's ethnic reason operationally through Jean-Paul Sartre's *serial practice* and *materiality*.

Perhaps the most important issue in archaeological practice and theory concerns the construction of legitimate, collective identities (Jones 1998:1). After the fragmentation of the national states' identity-building, researchers on ethnicity and nationalism have either rejected the idea of a world consisting of relatively homogenized national states as either a nation of a bygone era or a modernistic fantasy (Jones 1998:8; cf. Clifford 1988, 1992; Friedman 1989; Gilroy 1992; Hannerz 1989; Marcus 1989). Instead, the post-modern world is characterized by opposition tendencies with increasing globalization, on one side, and

fragmented identities, on the other. A multi-vocal, unstable and competing configuration is described, consisting of cultural identities from the local to the global in continuing, polyvalent, power regimes (Clifford 1992).

Jones claims that *ethnic identity* is characterised by a shifting, situational and subjective identifying of oneself and others which is rooted in daily practices and historical experience and which is also subject to transformation and discontinuity (Jones 1998:14). The re-conceptualising of ethnicity as an aspect of social organization resulted in two research areas (Jones 1998:28). The first research area included studies focusing on the relations between material culture and ethnic symbolism (e.g., Hodder 1982; Larick 1986; Haaland 1977; Pratzelis et al. 1987; Shennan 1989; Washburn 1989). The second research area concerned explorations of ethnicity in structured political or economic relations (e.g., Blackmore et al. 1979; Brumfiel 1994; Kimes et al. 1982; McGuire 1982; Odner 1982; Olsen 1985; Perlstein Pollard 1994).

Since the sixties, the predominant view in the western, social-scientific tradition has been the recognition of ethnic groups as self-defining systems and thus each ethnic group is defined on the basis of self-identification the and identification of others. Such a definition is further included in a theoretical frame, focusing on the construction of ethnic boundaries within social interaction and their organisational characteristics. Ethnicity is essentially seen as the recognition of identity towards other groups as a binary opposition between "us" and "them". Siân Jones partly follows this system with a processual and relational method towards ethnicity. The definition of ethnicity is: "*Ethnic groups are culturally ascribed identity groups, which are based on the expression of a real or assumed shared culture and common descent* (usually through the objectification of cultural, linguistic, religious, historical and/or physical characteristics)" (Jones 1998:84). Further, it is claimed that, as a process, ethnicity includes the consciousness concerning differences, which to a varying degree include reproduction and transformation of basic classification differences between groups of people who consider themselves distinct in one way or other

(Eriksen 1992:3). Jones claims that such a processual approach to the definition and analysis of ethnic groups includes several advantages compared with traditional, objective definitions and views of cultures as monolithic units. The definition was meant to ease analyses of the processes involved in the construction of ethnicity, and the ethnic factor in negotiating between social interaction and social relations which allows a platform for comparative studies of ethnicity while difficulties are circum-scribed from the abstraction of ethnic groups as separate, inte-grated, social units (Jones 1998 85). On the other hand, such processual approaches are criticized (e.g., Blu 1980:219; Chapman et al. 1989:16-17; Fardon 1987:175). For example, it is argued that processual definitions of ethnicity, independent of theoretical orientation, are essentially empty and thus applicable to every symbolically differentiated group with a strong feeling of identity such as gender, class and kin-based relations (Blu 1980:224; Just 1989:75). On the basic level, structures involved in processual ethnicity equal processes involved in the construction of gender, class and blood, as they are all cultural, constructed categories based on communication of a real or assumed real difference.

> However, boundaries between these different forms of identity are not clear-cut, and ethnic differences are frequently enmeshed in gender and class divisions in a complex matter. […] Consequently, in any particular analysis it is necessary to consider the intersection of different kinds of identity – ethnic, class, gender and so on – and the way they become institutionalized in different societies (Jones 1998:85-86; see also Eriksen 1992:172-179).

Thus, Jones considers the critique and suggests that the taxonomic dilemma is solved by means of each separate, contextual analysis. A theoretical framework influences and conceptualizes a later methodology and a stringent, taxonomic theory eases analysis. This key point conveys an operationally clear-cut ethnicity with *serial practice* and *materiality*.

The second critique of formal/processual definitions claims that ethnicity is considered ahistorical and consequently larger social and historical contexts are not explored (e.g., Fardon 1987:175; Khan 1992:172-174; Muga 1984:10-14). By excluding vital characteristics such as language and culture, in relation to the definition of ethnic groups, there is a tendency to ignore the differences between them in various social and historical contexts. Processually, ethnicity encompasses a unitary, socio-cultural phenomenon present in different situations – both modern and pre-modern.

A broad, formal definition of ethnicity is therefore claimed as an analytic tool to explore different ethnic situations in different cultural contexts, in opposition to a complex historical definition, which includes types of ethnic groups and consequently plays down the general sides of ethnicity, especially the social and historical contexts (Jones 1998; Eriksen 1992:3, 17; 1993:12-13).

Jones further claims that there is an absence of a bridging theory between subjectivists and objectivists in both *primordialist* and *instrumentalist* explanations of ethnicity (Jones 1998:87). In *primordial* theories, cultural symbols are focused, while hardly any research is concerned with the relations between culture and ethnicity. *Primordialists* claim that the continuing importance of particular aspects of a culture stems from their psychological importance within an ethnic identity. In contrast to *primordialist* views, instrumentalist theories concern a distinction between cultures and ethnicity and focus on the organisational aspects of ethnicity and therefore the cultural differences on which ethnicity is based are taken for granted. Culture is reduced to a continuing set of symbols manipulated in the prolongation of altered group interests.

Pierre Bourdieu's praxis theory bridges, according to Jones, subjectivism and objectivism, as well as associated oppositions such as determinism vs. freedom, conservative against creative and individual against society through the development of the *habitus* concept.

> The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g. the material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively "regulated" and "regular" without in any way being the product of obedience to rules (Bourdieu 1977:72).

Habitus involves a socialisation process in which new experiences are structured according to structures created from earlier experiences and earlier experiences continue an important part of the socialisation process. Consequently, power structures are embodied which result in certain dispositions, that is cognitive and motivating structures which influence practice, often on an unconscious level.

With the practice theory of Bourdieu, it is claimed that the intersubjective construction of an ethnic identity based on common subliminal dispositions within the *habitus* forms and is formed by objective practice (Bentley 1987:173). Ethnic con-science and interests stem from similarities in *habitus* and certain cultural practices and historical experiences are recognized as symbolic, ethnic representations. The application of *habitus* in ethnic theory conveys a method for integrating *primordial* and *instrumental* dimensions with ethnicity within a complete, theo-retical paradigm concerning human agency. Ethnic focus on *habitus* allows a separation between ethnic borders and the distribution of objective, cultural traits (Bentley 1987:170). On the other hand, Bentley does not explain the relations between common subliminal dispositions with *habitus* and communication of cultural differences that lead up to the reproduction of ethnic categories. It follows that the relation between *habitus* and ethnicity is obscure. Qualitative variations are not considered in the form of cultural differences, which signalise ethnic identity. According to Jones the comparative value of *habitus* is also not examined critically, since *habitus* is treated as a uniform set of dispositions

with a high proportion of homology across separate, but still integrated social domains (Jones 1998:93). Bentley considers the ethnic identity to be a reflection of the *habitus* of the group and that this identity is generated by a subliminal consciousness of the similarity with others with similar *habitus*. Such a theory does not consider that feelings of ethnic affection and common experience are not necessarily the same. Similarities within *habitus* do not guarantee ethnic feelings, as differences in *habitus* do not exclude identification (Yelvington 1991). According to Jones, Bentley does not consider important research results of the organisational aspects of ethnicity and ethnic contrast – that ethnicity is a conscious difference related to the others. Ethnicity is not primarily constituted by subliminal consciousness of similarities; ethnicity is essentially a consciousness of differences. Social experience and knowledge involved in the creation of a conscious ethnicity and the formulation of ethnic categories, based on a fundamental break with the type of experience and knowledge that constitute an important part of *habitus* (Jones 1998:94).

Habitus functions in such a way that subjective organisation principles and associated types of knowledge, such as a classification system related to gender or class, tend toward a correspondence with existence relations. This correspondence results in a level unconscious social experience, *doxa*, which includes the misperception and naturalisation of real borders within the social order (Bourdieu 1977:164-165). The political functions of such a classification pass unnoticed, as agents are not aware of rivalry or antagonistic plans, thought or perception. *Doxa* is not the sole form of social knowledge. *Doxa* is reformed when a particular mode of living comes into question in practice. The result is the establishment of orthodox or heterodox forms of knowledge that involve a consciousness and acknowledgement of alternative forms of faith. *Orthodox* knowledge seeks to hinder the possibility of alternatives on a conscious level. *Heterodox* knowledge conveys the existence of several forms of knowledge and their evaluation through explicit criticism (Bourdieu 1977:168-169). Bourdieu explores these concepts in an analysis of class

formations, concepts which Jones utilizes by analogy with ethnic theory (Jones 1998: 95).

Social interaction with other agents with different cultural traditions reveals a reflexive perception mode. Such an exposure to cultural practice limits that up til now has been mastered in *doxa*, acknowledges and demands a change in discourse level to rationalize and systematize representations from such a cultural practice and general representation of the cultural tradition in itself (Bourdieu 1977:233). On this discursive level, ethnic categories are created; they are produced, reproduced and transformed through systematic communication of cultural differences in relation to cultural practices with the particular "ethnic others". Ethnicity involves the acknowledgement of common meanings and interests led by the *doxa* experience and knowledge within certain spheres of *habitus*, similarities which cannot really be discussed in a discursive form. The creation of an ethnic consciousness and symbol category involves a break with *doxa* as knowledge due to objective representations of cultural differences involved in an ethnic expression (Eriksen 1993:3). The effect reinforces a set of cultural practices and meanings which earlier was part of *doxa*. Cultural practice and meaning is more holistic and a substantial object in opposition to the "others".

Jones claims, in contrast to Bentley, that ethnic norm-ativity in pre-existing realities represented by a common *habitus* is highly variable. Closeness depends on cultural transformations conveyed by interaction processes and the state of power relations between interacting groups (Jones 1998:97). As a result of such processes, ethnic minorities may consist of people from different primordial groups, in which the substance of their identities stems from within *and* from the outside. The result is a *bricolage* created by the historical processes that form them (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:57). Reproduction of forms of cultural differences and difference relations embodies over time behaviour as part of the structuring dispositions of the *habitus* (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:60).

Despite Jones's utilization of abstract and theoretical concepts, such as *habitus* and *doxa*, these concepts are not actively used in her archaeological/ethnic case study, which can be interpreted as a weakness in the analysis. *Habitus* is mentioned only once under *Romanization Reconsidered*. "As an important part of the *habitus*, domestic architecture, such as bath houses and villas, may have been involved in the recognition and signification of a broad Roman identity with relation to particular people in some social domains" (Jones 1998:134). That architectonic features form Roman identity does not surprise and reference to *habitus* in the quote appears *ad hoc*. An essential concept such as *doxa* is not mentioned at all in *Romanization Reconsidered*. By focusing on super-organic concepts, such as ethnicity, a circular argument is evident; theory frames are reproduced in a dichotomy with the material in which the material meaning is conveyed from a deterministic premise within the ethnic definition itself. In other words, Siân Jones starts at the wrong end. The ground zero of an operational ethnic concept, is in my opinion, in factual, small-scale, performed actions. In the following pages, an operational, ethnic concept is discussed, which starts with *materiality* and *performed action*. But, first, the *logic of practice* is considered.

The logic of practice

Social action or agency means concepts that embrace a variety of different actions. Actions may be intended or unintended, have more or less predictable results, be consciously, semiconsciously or unconsciously constituted. The action does not necessarily predict a given result or predict further consequences and the spectre of unintended, consequential actions may be more or less apparent to different individuals. Many things that we perform on a daily schedule are routine actions, actions that seem self-evident, so that they do not need reflection, unless something surprising happens. When people interact in a regular, daily pattern, we find that they are structured to a certain extent. Daily behaviour rules can be explicitly expressed or be based on silent agreements or contracts.

Daily discourse is regulated by a mix of unconscious or (semi) conscious ways of doing things; the discourse is still not randomly constituted. Different individuals perform many tasks and daily routines in various ways, which is partly a result of pragmatic considerations and agreements. If something works, there is little reason for changing the routine (Fahlander 2003:30).

According to Slavoj Zizek, the subject's understanding of self and the environment, together with the affect and effect of agency, is often blurred, obscured and often misunderstood by the agent and others (Zizek 1989:31). The semi-conscious level of the agency can be faintly recognized; we recognize these actions if someone tells us, but otherwise they are performed without much consideration. Several routine actions are performed on a regular basis as the main part of our activity (Goffmann 1967; Giddens 1984; Tilley 1999:16; Conein 1998). Social action can be perceived as dualistic, a repeating relation between individual motives and influence from "the normal way of doing things". To be able to analyse unintended effects and structural implications, which constitute daily agency, the paradigm must be treated in an analytic manner. A first step is to discuss *materiality* in relation to *agency* in a time/space perspective (Fahlander 2003:31).

Serial action and serial categories

Sartre developed concepts of the individual's regular coactions in solitude. It is the concept series which is important in the analysis of the collective character of an individual action (Fahlander 2003:32). According to Sartre, we are subordinate neither to our biological forces nor to our biographies; we have the opportunity to be aware of our existence in the world. Existentially conscious individuals can to a certain extent choose alternative courses or at least leave "the normal way of doing things". Despite the passive constitution of the ego through experience and the state of consciousness trapped in fields of practical immobility, the ego is still exposed to its own products (Sartre 1988:292; 1991:46). These products and the temporary, relative states of "I" (that is, to be

conscious of ones self as one or several historical "I"s) clear a basis for the individual to stand on the side of certain discursive rules (Sartre 1991:24, cf. Börjesson 1986:160). In this perspective, individuals may through semi-conscious actions in fact change their social worlds. Late in his life, Sartre developed these ideas towards a more complex form. In *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1991 [1960]) he merged existential philosophy with Marxist theory. He provides a picture of a social totality, structural element, without excluding individual intentions and perspectives. The plurality of sociality is not just described as constituted of atomised and autonomic subjects, but rather as a total process in which social plurality is integrated. Sartre claims that larger, social collectives constitute both a polyvalent isolation with millions of facets *and* an integrated member (Sartre 1991:257). An interesting notion in Sartre's work that illustrates this process is *serial action* (1991:256-269). Sartre claims that many socially constituted collectives are better seen as *series*, that is, as an immovable effect of separate activities, rather than as social groups or categories. To be part of a group, in Sartre's opinion, the subject has to act consciously, by fraternising, and besides adhere to a common cause. What are often conceived of as social groups or categories do not qualify for this definition. Instead, many social collectives should be recognised as temporary series, constituted by common circum-stances and individuals in a situation (1991:258).

As an illustrative example, Sartre depicts a group waiting for a bus. These individuals may have different genders, have different, embodied characteristics and belong to different fraternities. They are not integrated as a group in a strict sense but are rather united by a common goal: to drive the bus. Individuals in the queue would probably not see themselves as a group and they do not share a common social milieu or common discriminating features. This particular series is defined by a fleeting homogeneity. Sartre's example may seem banal and his distinctions less meaningful, but the example may be useful in an analysis of social plurality. Marion Young, has for example, utilized serial perspectives in feministic theory (Fahlander 2003:33). Feminist theory has had

difficulties with the definition of the homogenous category of women as a subjected group (Butler 1990:324). Women's individual situations in different social milieux vary and many do not share the same social problems or goals (Braidotti 1991:158; Moore 1994:10). Young's solution to the obstacle is to see "women" and "gender" as series rather than social groups or categories. This particular subjective series is not defined by biological gender or femininity, but by social order. It is, for example, not surprising if there are more women in the queue, while the husband use the family car. In this example, there is a direct coexistence with a superstructure, gender ideology, with individual *agency* and materiality. *Agency* is a keyword; the series is not necessarily defined by the subjects' intentions, but by their actions. The people in the queue have acted according to different agendas in the special placement of themselves in space/time. Sartre's series concept is therefore fitting in a description of social categories as a result of both individual agency and motives regarding social, subjective processes and other structural forces. To utilize Sartre's example even better, *serial categories* are added. Such categories are defined from set, repetitive, serial acts, instead of simple, temporary series, as in the bus-queue example (Fahlander 2003:34).

Most individuals participate in set, serial collectives through daily activities. After the bus queue, some individuals establish other types of series at work etc.; every serial membership that the person is involved in does not necessarily mean a constituting of social identity. A profession may mean a lot to some, while others base their identities on other premises. On the other hand, very few define themselves as "publicly transported". From this, it follows that, in a performed action-perspective, individual, temporary serial situations may be discussed instead of subject roles or status roles, and serial categories instead of social categories. In this way, Sartre's concept seems effective in a discussion of agency and social processes, as well as in a description of individual actions from a structural viewspoint (Fahlander 2003:34). The premise above forms the core of *serial*

epistemology and provides a further basis for analysis of archaeological materiality.

Materiality and serial action

A main point that Sartre stated was that agency not only is a social phenomenon. Agency is constituted, enhanced or prohibited by the material condition of the action. A social relation is rarely an activity between social subjects alone; materiality is always involved in one way or other (Gosden 1994:77; Latour 1998). Series of individual actions do not reflect only intentions and time/space; actions are also created in relation to a *material world*. In the bus-queue example, the bus or the presence of a public transportation system is the central focus where this particular series takes place. The bus is not just a material symbol, but also a cog in the complex machinery that provides the city's typical life (Lynch 1960). The material constitution of the bus and its properties as speed, number of seats, etc., are not unimportant. The series depends on such factors (Fahlander 2001:61, 2003:35). That artefacts and materiality are involved in social processes is well known and provides an increasing research field, including archaeology (Latour 1991, 1992; Riggins 1994; Gottdiener 1995; Andrén 1997; Komter 1998; Schiffer 1999; Preda 1999; Graves-Brown 2000; Cornell and Fahlander 2002; Fahlander 2003). Attempts to embody things, artefacts and environmental aspects as social *actants* in a social process vary from the symbolic to raw data. The social potential of things and artefacts is not determined; whether they are active or not; as *actants* they operate on different levels. Materialities may simply be good to think with, according to Levi-Strauss (1966), or to serve as metaphors or vessels for the thought (Tilley 1999). Materialities may have an almost determined effect on subjects. One can be held back or be stimulated by objects, conscious or unconscious. They may be produced or fitted with specific intentions and still influence future actions in an unforeseen way. The material, built environment is as much a

generator of social behaviour as vice versa. One example is houses and buildings. They seem to live and actively perform in society, just like people (Donley-Reid 1990:349; Parker Pearson and Richards 1994; Bourdieu 1977:90; Cornell and Fahlander 2002:123). Houses and buildings are focuses for repeating actions, which is caused by their immovability and resistance to change. As social subjects, houses are not homogenous, but tend towards differing biographies. Buildings may be raised for one purpose and re-used for another.

Most are involved in more or less complex serial patterns through their daily, weekly or yearly routines. Such temporary jumps in and out of different serial collectives have many similarities with Hägerstrand's time/space geography (1970, 1985). Social individuals follow repeated time/space roads in their daily lives. For some in the bus queue, it is one-way travel, while others may find themselves in the same queue at the same time next day, and so on, maybe because of transport to their work. Hägerstrand and other time-geographers point out the regularity of the movement (in solitude or in series) when they perform their daily practices.

Serial paths include forms of environmental and social limits, such as the need for regular sleep and food, the type of available transportation and social restrictions such as laws or norms. These limitations are not generally valid for all individuals and have temporary implications. A city park can, for instance, be a popular spot during the daytime, but perhaps not secure for women at night (Fahlander 2003:37).

Sartre's serial concept points out the collective character of social life. In fact, it seems that structuring practice is often regulated and is routinely performed and is often structured in time/space paths in relation to the material world. Individuals may in many situations act and think as individuals, while they still reproduce patterns following general, social and material conditions. Serial perspectives do not necessarily stem from what the agent thinks of the material that surrounds him or her. Individuals notice materiality in different ways; some things they

find ugly and other things practical; some things we like and in daily routine, we do not think in particular about most of them. Concerning serial practice, Sartre mentions that there are serial feelings and serial thoughts. "Series is a mode of being for individuals both in relation to one another and in relation to their common being and this mode of being transforms all their structures" (Sartre 1991:266). Keywords in Sartre's perspective are the slowly evolving stability within social practice with materialities functioning as nodes in a structuring process. There are also interesting connections between individual actions and the more general aspects of social structuring. Sartre's serial concept is a theory concerning social action or *performed action*. To establish analytically operational concepts, tools must be developed for a discussion of social action generally and in particular. Here, the concepts of series, serial ways and serial categories are expanded with the introduction of the concepts of *structuring practice* and *structuring positivities*.

Structuring practice and structuring positivities

Following the discussion on the state of actions, individual or collective, actions seem to a large extent to be regular and routinely performed. Temporary regulations, intentions and individuals' action experiences may vary, but social action tends towards time/space patterns in relation to a material world. This does not mean that social actions are uniform, without exceptions or particularities. According to Fahlander, different social actions are connected in different ways, such as culture, discourse or "the normal way of doing things". These concepts are integrated and available in various degrees to social subjects; their actions generally follow a fleeting serial pattern in space, which us temporarily concentrated around nodes in the material world. Giddens's notion of the duality of structures does not cover how structuring processes function on a particular level (Giddens 1993:6-7). For instance, Arthur Stinchcombe has noted that some agents seem more rational in some situations than others (1986:5).

Likewise, Mouzelis (1989) notes that agents interact with other agents, which are differently structured with another power position. Margaret Archer (1982) notes that there are social situations in which the structure has a greater impact and likewise that there are areas of less structural impact.

The plurality in structuring theory is, according to Fahlander, an advantage (2003:40). There cannot be one general theory that specifies relations between every social factor and materiality. A focus on the micro-level of practice does not necessarily mean that more general, structuring elements are lost sight of. Garfinkel (1967), Hägerstrand (1970:9), Goffmann (1971:11; 1974) and Collins (1981) have all claimed that many important aspects are to be found outside the time/space of social situations and that these relations are often hidden or bypassed silently by the agents involved as they are taken for granted. Social action is therefore not just a question about individual intentions and motives but is always related to a larger reference frame. If the predicament is correct, that social practice is constituted by both general and local structuring elements, then individual action is a little about both. Relations between the general and the particular provide the opportunity to go from detailed studies of particular actions towards the general aspects of social life. Therefore, the performed activities of a particular situation are to be seen as a medium between the particular and the general. Social practices are in different ways a result of the properties of a particular situation. However, these cannot be seen as unique, as they also include traditions, institutionalised power relations and other aspects of the outer world.

That subjects involved in a situation or occasion may have different opinions of what happened, why it happened, how and what the future implications are not important in this setting. By focusing on performed action rather than the subjective experiences of an action, the analyses are not restricted to a special social or regional frame of reference. Generally, the study of social action is normally related to certain practice references, such as society, regions, nations, culture or, most important here;

ethnic groups. The reason is that such units are supposed to encompass a general homogeneity in relation to norms, laws and cosmology, where the symbolic universe of all social actions finds inspiration and therefore meaning. Such narrow borders rarely frame structuring effects. Giddens claims, for instance, that "All societies are both social systems, and at the same time, constituted by the intersection of multiple social systems" (Giddens 1984: 164). The notion of crossing social character and structural elements indicates that ideologies and political structures are not framed by simple, social formations, but can also be divided and connected with other formations in regional and global networks (cf. Wallerstein 1974-89; Ekholm 1981; Friedman 1994).

To analyse social practice as multi-vocal and heterogenic regarding social and space barriers, the concepts of *structuring practice* and *structuring positivity* are applied operationally. Especially the concept of *structuring positivity* may be substituted for ethnicity as a more dynamic and flexible concept with material and operational connotations. Structuring practices are regular and serially constituted actions. They are not only particular, regular and repeated activities of an institutionalised or ritualised type. Structuring aspects involved are in most social practice, even if the degree of involvement varies. In contrast to concepts such as tradition, rituals and culture, such practices are often not visible to the individuals that perform and observe them. This is not the same as discursive practice; structuring practice is not necessarily related to a particular discourse. Structuring practices are continued routine that we perform with a kind of regularity, day to day, weekly, monthly or yearly. Such practices may be related to daily subsistence, such as eating or sleeping regularly. Structuring practice may also be of a more cultural type, related to games, aesthetic values, rituals or activity (Fahlander 2003:42).

Structuring practices are narrowed to social actions, in that they can be observed, even if others misconceive them. There are exceptions; singular actions have a potential for structuring if they are observable results or are materially manifested. Structuring practices are, as serial practice, basically performed in relation to

materiality. This key point implies an opportunity for an abduction of action through its standing remains in the material world (Fahlander 2003:42).

To illustrate the aspect of the abduction of an action and then track the action in time through materiality, a modern, singular action may be fitting. The funeral of the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme consisted of a singular action which seems to have unintentionally generated a structuring practice. Before the official funeral, Swedish citizens seldom used white coffins. When a white coffin was used, it was usually a woman buried in such a coffin. Since Prime Minister Palme's broadcast funeral, in which such a white coffin was used, that particular type has increased in popularity for both sexes (Göteborgsposten 2002). A corresponding change in inhumation practice among the Romans could easily, using Jones's concepts, be interpreted as ethnic change.

Structuring positivities, on the other hand, refer to general patterns of actions spanning longer periods and larger space. *Structuring positivities* concern clutters of resistant, structuring practices. From an archaeological point of view, structuring practices are normally tracked via fragmented elements traceable in mute artefacts. The concept of *structuring positivities* is to be understood as being different from Giddens's concept of *structuring positivity* and Lévi-Strauss's structures, in that they do not include any essential substance. They are not super-organic structures, but rather produced, reproduced and changed by the serial and structural actions of individuals. Like Giddens's structures, *structuring positivities* are more or less clear to the individuals who (re)produce them, but they may also be obscure to others. The second part of the expression, *positivity*, points to their general, unchangeable and resistant role. *Structuring positivities* are not things in a Durkheimian sense; a *structuring* positivity is not defined, it does not define anything special (Cornell and Fahlander 2002:66; Fahlander 2003:43). Despite their virtual character, structuring positivities can be highly homogenizing factors. They are not bound from within, they do not define the typical way in which a social

collective is performed; rather they transcend probably social, temporary and space limits. Such *positivities* do not work in solitude; there are often inconsistent structuring practices present that withstand the usual way of doing things within a social frame.

Some *structuring positivities* are very persistent, but when they change or cease, this normally has a great importance for mind and practice. Such an example may be the patriarchal order. The subjection of women in the present has several implications for both genders, for instance that there would be more women in the bus queue. Moreover, there are similar social situations and agencies defined as feminine and natural according to general *structuring positivities* in a patriarchy and a heterosexual norm.

The concepts of structuring practice and *structuring positivity* do not insist that the subject is necessarily perceived outside the centre as structural determinism or defined by a super-organic, invisible hand shaping social action. The serial perspective with performed actions launches an analysis of reproduction of a dominant discourse and categories, perceived *structuring positivities* as a replacement for *ethnicity*. Fredrik Barth states that, if an ethnic group is tracked through time, a cultural history is *not* followed (Barth 1969:38). Culture-historical materiality is thus not commensurable with ethnicity. However, in my opinion, it is possible to track *performed action* through *materiality* and then, maybe, a *structuring positivity* in each contextual analysis.

In the introductory quotation from Imre Kertész, the main character evolves when his state of *habitus* represented by *doxa* is transformed into *ortho-* or *hetero-doxi* when he considers his situation. His state does not correspond to the "right ideal". Consequently, he is disqualified with regard to Siân Jones's definition of ethnicity. For an ethnic reason he should have felt different from guards and SS soldiers, not "his own", the other Jews. Ethnicity is an extremely complex matter, and I think that the main characters' situation may be analysed with better accuracy by *serial practice* and *materiality*. Daily routines and the very materiality of the KZ-Lager further depict a *structuring positivity*, an idea historically probably better known as the

modernity project, which the novel criticises. Consequently, the Holocaust is the most grotesque example of modernity. Thus, what seemingly concerns ethnicity is rather a question of something else.

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